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Abstract Invasions by invasive non-native species
(INNS) can have profound consequences for natural
environments, impacting on biodiversity and the
biophysical landscape in ways that can endanger other
species, human wellbeing and infrastructure. The
financial costs of dealing with established INNS
populations can be extremely high. Biosecurity mea-
sures (simple procedures designed to reduce the risk of
human activities spreading INNS to new areas) are
being promoted in order to minimize these negative
impacts and associated costs. This paper reports on
research undertaken with stakeholder organisations
that operate within UK natural environments. It aims
to evaluate stakeholder perceptions of their role in
INNS biosecurity practice in the UK, and the impli-
cations of this for INNS strategy more broadly. Semi-
structured interviews were undertaken with organisa-
tion representatives to explore current practices and
communications about INNS and perceptions of
barriers and opportunities to implement better biose-
curity. Whilst participants generally agreed on the
need for biosecurity, there were variations among
participants in levels of knowledge about INNS
(related to background) and the capacity of organisa-
tions to engage in biosecurity practices (related to
organisational size). Critical barriers to biosecurity
were identified as costs, lack of clear guidance,
difficulties changing attitudes and implementing col-
lective responsibility, and reactionary versus precau-
tionary approaches. As a result, partnership working
on INNS is difficult and action tends to focus on
individual species perceived as the most threatening to
a particular organisations’ interests. In this way, action
on INNS biosecurity faces the kinds of barriers that are
common to many environmental problems where
individuals/organisations prioritise self-interest
despite the potential to obtain greater benefits if
collective action could be achieved.
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Introduction
Invasive non-native species (INNS) are plants and
animals that have been purposefully or accidentally
introduced, mainly by human activity (Anderson et al.
2014b), to areas outside of their natural range and have
the ability to spread causing damage to the environ-
ment, the economy, human health and the way we live
(GBNNSS 2015). The term is equivalent to the term
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Invasive Alien Species used by the IUCN, and may
also be used to encompass non-native microbes such
as bacteria, viruses and fungi, which negatively impact
human, animal and plant health. INNS are increas-
ingly recognised as a significant and potentially very
costly threat to environments across the globe, with
efforts to control and prevent harm from their growing
populations estimated to run into billions of dollars
(Anderson et al. 2014b; Mcleod et al. 2015).
Biosecurity is key to preventing and/or slowing the
spread of INNS. Biosecurity refers to protection
against biological threats (Armstrong and Ball 2005)
and is the term given to measures designed to prevent
the spread of INNS to new areas. Essentially it
involves employing simple hygienic practices includ-
ing the use of duplicate sets of equipment and
employing cleaning measures that ensure environment
users do not transfer INNS propagules [individuals
released into an environment where they are not native
(Lockwood et al. 2005)] between sites on their
equipment, vehicles, clothing and footwear (Dunn
and Hatcher 2015; Anderson et al. 2014b). The
potential gains from achieving widespread adoption
of effective biosecurity measures are clear. By
preventing the spread of INNS in the first place we
can avoid damage to the environment and the expense
of implementing control measures, along with the
associated ethical complexities concerning extermi-
nation. Whilst controls that eliminate INNS in their
entirety from invaded areas can be successful, partic-
ularly in island contexts, control measures do not
always succeed in fully eradicating invaders from
areas where they have become established, can
themselves cause environmental damage, and do not
necessarily result in the successful re-establishment of
the native ecosystems that existed prior to invasion
(Zavaleta et al. 2001). By contrast, biosecurity avoids
these problems and therefore presents a much more
attractive option. However, as with any new technol-
ogy, idea or approach, getting people to adopt
biosecurity measures involves a gradual process of
behaviour change which may take time to be adopted
as a social norm (Rogers 2003). The complexity of
social values and very high levels of uncertainty
surrounding INNS management (Liu et al. 2011) are
likely to complicate the adoption of biosecurity
measures by stakeholders.
Regulation 1143/2014 on Invasive Alien Species is
the first piece of EU legislation on biodiversity for
more than 20 years and entered into force in 28 States
on 1st January 2015. Within the regulation three types
of intervention are described (prevention, early detec-
tion and eradication), and management and co-ordi-
nation of responses to INNS, especially across
national boundaries, is strongly advised (Genovesi
et al. 2015). Biosecurity measures operate at the
prevention stage, by reducing the risk of transferring
INNS to new areas.
In the UK a large number of terrestrial and aquatic
plant and animal species are considered to qualify as
INNS and official steps have been taken by govern-
ment to build capacity to identify and monitor them,
undertake control measures and prevent their spread to
new areas, most notably through the creation of the
GB non-native species secretariat (GBNNSS) in 2006.
Recent campaigns launched by Defra (The UK
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
to encourage public awareness and action on INNS
include Check Clean Dry (www.nonnativespecies.
org/checkcleandry/) and Be Plant Wise (www.
nonnativespecies.org/beplantwise/). Check Clean
Dry is aimed at encouraging watercourse users to
employ measures to prevent the transfer of aquatic
INNS to new areas, with users advised to check their
equipment and clothes for the presence of animal or
plant fragments, clean them and ensure items dry out
thoroughly in between visits to aquatic sites. Be Plant
Wise is aimed at pond owners, gardeners and the
horticultural trade in aquatic plants for ponds and
aquariums and seeks to raise awareness of the negative
impacts that can result from allowing ornamental
aquatic plants to spread into the wild.
Over the last decade the tide of literature concern-
ing INNS issues has risen, with many articles focusing
on questions of ecological and evolutionary interest
including species and environmental traits contribut-
ing to invasiveness and invasibility (van Kleunen et al.
2010), the consequences of genetic bottlenecks for
invading populations (Dlugosch and Parker 2008;
Simberloff 2009) and the potential impacts of changes
to climate upon invasions (Broennimann et al. 2007;
Rahel and Olden 2008). However, despite clearly
constituting a socio-ecological problem, to date rela-
tively little has been published about the social
dimensions of INNS (Garcı´a-Llorente et al. 2008)
and the influence of humans on the incidence and
outcome of invasions. Recent studies have investi-
gated the behaviours of recreational users of
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waterways in relation to the spread of INNS (Anderson
et al. 2014b) and the attitudes and beliefs of recre-
ationists in relation to behaviours that reduce the
spread of INNS (Prinbeck et al. 2011). However,
where social issues are considered, the majority of
research has concerned control measures rather than
prevention, with research often exploring public
support for action on existing INNS (Schu¨ttler et al.
2011; Shine and Doody 2011). To date research has
yet to investigate the attitudes of organisations, which
represent key stakeholders working in natural envi-
ronments, to biosecurity and preventing the spread of
INNS.
Today’s globally burgeoning INNS problem is
closely related to ever-proliferating levels of human
cross-global trade and travel (Bradley et al. 2012;
Tobin et al. 2013), and its solutions are likely to face
collective action problems. Collective action problems
occur when there is conflict between individual and
group interests and are widespread in relation to the
environment. Individual selfish actions often harm the
environment whereas groups benefit from environ-
mental protection, and it often requires groups of
people to work together to achieve positive outcomes
(Ostrom 1990). Introduction of INNS may result from
the actions of only one individual, whereas biosecurity
practice will require both individuals and organisa-
tions to work together to prevent the spread of INNS.
Here we report on research undertaken with UK
stakeholder organisations to better understand biose-
curity’s current role and future potential in INNS
action in the UK. Our aim is to evaluate stakeholder
perceptions of their role in INNS biosecurity practice
in the UK and the implications for INNS strategy by:
(1) exploring awareness and perceptions of INNS risk
amongst participants; (2) exploring perceived barriers
to biosecurity uptake that impact on organisations; (3)
identifying drivers and opportunities for implementing
biosecurity with stakeholders; and (4) considering the
mechanisms by which the identified barriers may be
overcome and opportunities exploited.
Materials and methods
This research was conducted with the aim of better
understanding organisational engagement in invasive
species management, and specifically to explore
perceptions of barriers to and motivations for
biosecurity uptake. Because of this, the research team
elected to employ a qualitative approach to data
collection and data analysis. Users of UK natural
environments decide whether or not to undertake
biosecurity based on their attitudes and identities, both
of which grow out of the experiences they have
undergone. In this way, biosecurity decisions are
similar to decisions about whether to employ other
pro-environmental behaviours, and can be best under-
stood with insights into the experiential knowledge
held by individuals in organisations. Whilst it is not
impossible to collect some forms of data on experi-
ential knowledge quantitatively, the complexity and
uniqueness of the lived experience means that qual-
itative methods are often better placed to elicit a
greater level of understanding (Fazey et al. 2006).
Qualitative methods often rely on dialogue as a
mode of data collection (Morgan 2011) and the
qualitative method chosen here was to conduct semi-
structured interviews with participants using a topic
guide. Unlike set questionnaires, semi-structured
interviews benefit from being loosely structured,
allowing the interviewer to guide the discussion
around topics of interest, but to remain sensitive to
the fact that their initial understandings may change as
the interview progresses (Morgan 2011). This
approach also gives greater agency to the participants,
allowing them to spend time discussing areas of
particular interest to them, or to raise new issues. This
leads to a scenario where interviewer and participant
can develop a rapport, and participants are more likely
to reveal their underlying views and motivations, or
express nuanced, complicated information about the
topics being discussed. Whilst this enables insights
that might otherwise be missed, it results in interview
transcripts that are unique and non-equivalent, with
some areas of discussion covered only by some
participants and not others. As such, the resulting
interview transcripts produce a dataset that is analysed
narratively and thematically, rather than to produce a
quantitative representation of views. As such, the
results of the research do not claim or attempt to
proportionally represent organisational stances on
biosecurity, but rather to provide insights into the
nature of the range of positions expressed by partic-
ipants which will be useful for understanding the issue
of biosecurity uptake.
A stakeholder analysis (Reed et al. 2009) was used
to identify a range of organisations that carry out
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activities in natural environments in the UK. A total of
38 stakeholder organisations were identified and
representatives from all organisations were contacted
for interview. Contacts focused predominantly on
organisations operating within the Yorkshire Dales
area, which enabled the research team to exploit links
to a local environment network by using contacts as
organisational gatekeepers. One representative each
from a total of 10 national and 5 regional organisations
(but representative of regional organisations found
across the country) were interviewed, including busi-
ness (2), leisure (3), conservation (4), education (1)
and public bodies (5). Interview participants were
encouraged to speak about their perceptions of local,
regional and national level action on biosecurity
within their organisation.
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in
April–September 2015, by a single interviewer, at
locations convenient to the participant, often their
place of work, and ranged in duration from 45 to
90 min (depending on the responses given by partic-
ipants). The interviewer guided the interview accord-
ing to a pre-determined topic guide, which had been
co-produced by the five members of the research team.
The guide explored participants’ awareness of INNS,
current biosecurity practice and policy within their
organisation, and their perceptions of barriers to
effective biosecurity and opportunities for improving
the uptake of biosecurity measures. Participants were
guaranteed anonymity for themselves and their organ-
isation in order to encourage them to speak openly
about their views and to raise any additional related
issues they considered important.
The interviews were recorded and then transcribed
to create a dataset. The transcribed interviews were
analysed using open coding of the data into cate-
gories, some pre-determined by the focus of the
research but with others emerging from the data
(Bhattacherjee 2012). These categories were risk,
biosecurity policy, biosecurity practice, barriers,
opportunities, motivations/reputation, communication
pathways, species of concern, other environmental/
health and safety issues, partnership working and
awareness. Axial coding was then used to identify
connections between categories and over-arching
themes emerging from the categories (Bhattacherjee
2012) in the context of collective action. The validity
of the analysis was evaluated through a process of
triangulation where two researchers carried out anal-
ysis of the data simultaneously to enable categories
and themes to be cross-checked. Initial findings were
also discussed with the respondents to further validate
the results.
Results
Awareness of INNS risk
All interview participants recognised that INNS pose
major risks to the environment. However, they
displayed varying levels of awareness of the pathways
by which specific INNS can be spread (especially of
the risks attached to the kinds of activities the
organisations themselves were carrying out). Some
(6/15) also displayed poor knowledge of the types of
negative impact brought about by specific INNS.
These differences in knowledge and awareness were
largely attributable to staff expertise on the subject.
Participants that had background qualifications in
ecology knew a great deal about INNS, whilst those
without were less aware of how their organisation’s
activities might contribute to the spread of INNS and
were confused about the impacts associated with
particular species.
The risks associated with INNS were identified as
both the risks of negative impacts of INNS, and also
the risk of contributing to the spread of INNS through
field activities. Negative impacts could be both direct
and indirect, with direct impacts having measurable
financial repercussions for organisations’ operational
capacity. Direct impacts such as riverbank erosion due
to burrowing Signal Crayfish or the dieback of
Himalayan Balsam monocultures, public health and
safety issues caused by phytotoxicity of Giant Hog-
weed, loss of timber due to tree diseases, damage to
infrastructure and associated flooding risks, and
impacts on drinking water quality and supply from
Zebra Mussel infestations of reservoirs, were all
identified. Indirect impacts (relating mainly to envi-
ronmental effects such as biodiversity loss), whilst not
always causing immediate financial problems, were
still recognised as undesirable. For example, for those
organisations with a remit to encourage public enjoy-
ment of natural areas, biodiversity loss was perceived
as a threat to visitor numbers:
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If we start losing native species that are in
decline then it could have significant impacts [on
visits] (Interview participant K).
Indirect impacts also included the risks of reputational
damage and possible prosecution for failing to act on
INNS.
Many activities were identified as risky for spread-
ing INNS, including travel between sites and the re-
use of equipment. Generally, greater awareness was
displayed of the risks associated with field activities
involving aquatic environments (such as ecological
monitoring using nets, dredging and reservoir safety
tests). A theme identified by all participants was that
greater risk was attached to activities carried out by
members of the public and contractors because these
groups were considered to be less aware of (or inclined
to implement) biosecurity measures.
A degree of ambivalence about INNS was evident
for a small number of participants (2/15), who
suggested that over longer timespans INNS may be
assimilated ecologically so that they are eventually no
longer considered INNS. But participants more com-
monly agreed (9/15) that it was important to act early
in order to stop new INNS invasions before they
became established.
Some of the larger organisations represented by
participants (7/15) had taken the step of employing
dedicated biosecurity personnel or explicitly including
responsibility for biosecurity within the remit of
specific staff members, but for smaller organisations
(which were often membership-based and leisure-
focussed) taking such a step wasn’t possible. Moves
towards the development of official INNS strategies
had also been taken by some of the larger organisa-
tions (5/15), with some engaged in the process of
producing detailed risk assessments on a species by
species basis (6/15). Detailing the risks associated
with individual species was identified as a way that
priority action (and budget allocation) could be
initiated. However, this style of approach also aligned
with a tendency to react to specific threats rather than
to implement general preventative action.
Barriers to biosecurity uptake
Inevitably costs are associated with implementing
biosecurity, and can act as impediments to adoption by
organisations and their networks. Monetary costs
identified related to purchasing duplicate sets of
equipment, paying for awareness-raising placards to
be put up in natural areas and the costs of paying for
and transporting cleaning equipment. Additionally
there were issues of time costs for staff employing
biosecurity measures or undertaking spot checks to
assess biosecurity compliance, as well as space costs
for equipment drying. Logistical difficulties with
washing large pieces of machinery and vehicles were
also identified as a difficult cost barrier to overcome.
Environmental employees can feel ‘overworked and
underpaid’ (interview participant H) and requirements
that add to workloads were considered to be unpop-
ular. Other priorities may also outweigh biosecurity
considerations within organisations:
£X million [for biosecurity] sounds like a lot of
commitment but our business value is £X billion,
so it’s small potatoes in terms of the risk to the
company (Interview participant G).
The existence of conflicting guidance within the
public domain about which biosecurity measures are
effective, the lack of a well-developed, co-ordinated
national strategy and adequate legislation, and poorly
thought out and utilised communication channels were
identified as particular problems. The lack of targeted
information can result in information overload and
individual inaction:
I think that there is information overload at
times… so there is lots of information coming in
from various directions and sometimes there is
so much that people are so busy in their day to
day stuff that it is probably not read…cascading
some of that information onto other staff isn’t
always as effective as it might be, only because
whoever does it doesn’t do it as well or because
people aren’t listening or interested or whatever
(Interview participant D).
At the same time inadequate guidance can lead to a
lack of action on the part of organisations against staff
or contractors failing to comply with biosecurity:
There’s no real penalty there. How many people
do you see prosecuted by the Environment
Agency for non-compliance of biosecurity?
(Interview participant F).
It can be difficult to get many people, each with their
own identities and related beliefs, values, interests
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and attitudes, to collectively implement the same, or
complementary, behaviour change. Whilst some
individuals were acknowledged to have a passion
for biosecurity, others were simply not interested
and had other priorities, and ultimately convincing
them to employ biosecurity would not happen
overnight:
Yes. Well they are all stuck in their ways, it is a
change of behaviour which takes time. (Inter-
view participant C).
As a result it can feel futile to be undertaking
biosecurity when others are failing to do the same:
I think the main internal and external barrier
that I see is the Catch 22 of people being
sceptical saying, ‘unless everyone’s doing it then
there is no point’ (Interview participant D).
In this respect, groups of people who only sporadically
visit resources, such as contractors and members of the
public are of particular concern:
So it becomes a little bit of a difficult job because
you are trying to get all your staff to do all this,
but there are far more anglers than you have
staff who will be going to different waterways
wearing the same boots, using the same keep net,
using the same rod. So it’s very difficult, you can
do your absolute best every day of your life, but
your impact will be diluted enormously by the
activities of all the people who use your water
(Interview participant F).
It was widely agreed (9/15) that it is important to act
early by employing precautionary measures in order to
prevent new INNS invasions before they become
established:
The older ones that have been around for a
while, some of them it is debatable to whether
they are necessarily invasive… but in many
respects the damage is already done with those
species. New species coming into the area
potentially have impacts that cause more dam-
age, and it would be easier and will cost less to
get rid of them to begin with (Interview partic-
ipant H).
Despite this recognition that a precautionary approach
should be guiding biosecurity commitments, in reality
organisations were much more likely to undertake
actions in response to specific known threats with the
potential to directly impact on their organisation’s
interests:
I work at the coal face so for me it is all about
what impacts on us, but XXXX would give you a
high level national answer… They would say ‘It
is the species that we could have most influence
over, just arrived’ and ‘the species that have the
greatest impact on Water Framework Directive’
(Interview participant O).
Some interviewees (7/15) commented that before their
organisation would be likely to formally request
biosecurity measures from environment users (staff,
contractors, members of the public and tenants) they
would need clear, scientific evidence about how their
activities might be associated with pathways of spread,
and about the efficacy of the biosecurity measures
being undertaken to combat this:
We don’t do anything on a precautionary
principle because then people think ‘What are
we doing this for?’… We just need to have the
evidence to back it up and a pretty solid basis for
asking people to do it otherwise they won’t
(Interview participant B).
Linked to this are issues around the visibility of
species and impacts. On one hand pathogens and many
INNS propagules are invisible to the naked eye and
therefore unlikely to be a conscious concern for many
environment users:
Part of the problem with a lot of these issues is
that, it’s a bit like radiation, a lot of the problem
is you can’t see it. So people don’t understand.
They tend to think if they can’t see it why are they
doing it? (Interview participant F).
On the other hand, established invasions can be highly
visible, with the risk of public criticism and reputa-
tional damage for not dealing with visible infestations,
such as Japanese Knotweed, Giant Hogweed and
Himalayan Balsam:
Hogweed and some of the plant diseases are
health and safety risks where it’s an offence to
spread them on the land. And Water Framework
Directive is very clear, where we could get an
ASBO, that’s a significant reputational issue
(Interview participant G).
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Action to protect an organisation’s reputation and to
avoid alienating public support is often a priority,
particularly given that most organisations now rely
directly on support from the public in the form of
membership fees, volunteer contributions, charita-
ble donations or customer payments:
We tend to spend our money on things like
Japanese Knotweed and Hogweed because the
health and safety element of Giant Hogweed
means you’ve got to treat it because from a
reputation point of view if you’ve got Giant
Hogweed and it’s growing next to somebody’s
access… then it looks like it’s just negligent
management, so we have to do it, and that’s why
we prioritise it (Interview participant F).
But reputation as a key motivator for biosecurity has
its downsides. The fear of scrutiny can prevent an
organisation from disseminating biosecurity
messages:
We have got to get our house in order, how on
earth can we preach to other people if our own
land is not properly treated? (Interview partic-
ipant O).
Another problem with biosecurity efforts being driven
by concerns for reputation was the potential for a
separation between the front of ‘good practice’
presented by organisations and what is happening in
reality. For example, whilst contractors are often
awarded contracts on the basis that they promise to
employ adequate biosecurity measures, respondents
(9/15) were sceptical about how much such measures
were actually employed on the ground and highlighted
that the only way organisations can ascertain if
measures are being undertaken is by implementing
spot-checks, which are costly in terms of staff time. In
addition, where non-compliance was discovered dur-
ing routine checks, procedures were lengthy, paper-
work-heavy and not rigorously employed. There was
some cynicism about the degree to which organisa-
tions are genuinely committed to biosecurity (7/15),
with suggestions that the bureaucracy of administra-
tion could be used to deflect the focus from their own
shortcomings or to pass the responsibility on to
someone else:
Part of the trick you see is that you pass on the
responsibility to your contractor. We can smugly
say, oh we’ve got policy here, this is what we
want to see, go out and do it, but we won’t then
be making sure that our staff are doing that. And
this is part of the problem (Interview participant
F).
A similar issue was raised relating to the degree of
biosecurity information put out by organisations:
I’m being cynical, if you’re seen to be circulating
things it looks like you are doing stuff, but
actually, the things which have an effect are the
stuff right up on the coal face here… (Interview
participant F).
Drivers and opportunities
Whilst behavioural change tends to be a gradual and
complex process involving communication path-
ways, awareness-raising activities and changes to
norms and attitudes, there were mechanisms identi-
fied by which individuals could be influenced to
undertake biosecurity. First, the role of positive peer
pressure and the need for organisations to protect
their reputation:
It sounds bad but through peer pressure… if
someone sees you doing something wrong then
they will be like, ‘Hang on why are you doing
this, this is affecting everyone else’. So peer
pressure in a positive way rather than a negative
way (Interview participant B).
Whilst many participants (10/15) admitted that they
felt their own biosecurity undertakings might not
achieve effective results because of the activities of
others, they still acknowledged that their organisation
needed to be seen to be employing biosecurity in order
to set a good example:
We do need to try to show good practice and
hope that that will slowly rub off on some other
people (Interview participant D).
Second, social relationships between staff members of
organisations were identified as an important mecha-
nism for sharing information about INNS:
We chat regularly so they would inform us of
anything coming into the area (Interview par-
ticipant D).
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Third, experiential learning in the field, where first-
hand experience, such as observing the damage caused
by an INNS or comparing natives and invasives,
worked to convince people of the need to take action.
Fourth, Several interviewees (9/15) noted the
importance of capitalising on the energy that some
enthusiastic and passionate staff and volunteers have
about INNS issues. Face to face communication about
INNS issues was considered to be more effective than
the use of impersonal emails. As such the benefits
brought about by key individuals and opportunities for
partnership working were emphasized:
We need to find some people who are really
interested in this, it’s just finding them. And then
we can say, well here’s a project, develop a
strategy and a policy for us and we could have,
we’ve got a really good comms [communication]
team and we could say why don’t we have a
publicity campaign about biosecurity (Interview
participant F).
Finally, the normalisation of biosecurity was identified
as an important mechanism, similar to the process of
Health and Safety regulations gradually being adopted
in the past:
We went through a campaign… because our
health and safety record wasn’t brilliant, what
happened was our staff then all got trained up to
a really good standard, and what they would do
is they would shop the contractors if they saw
them infringing health and safety practice on
site… It’s empowered people, once we’d done
the formal training we did, they launched a
campaign… which was aimed at you, not being
told by line managers ‘you should be wearing a
life jacket when you are close to water’, but that
it’s your responsibility to take responsibility for
your co-workers (Interview participant F).
However, currently there are often limited opportuni-
ties to incentivize good biosecurity. In light of this
there were calls for the development of an accredited
national biosecurity standard.
Discussion
The barriers and opportunities described by partici-
pants centred on (i) uncertainty about potential
impacts and the actions of others, (ii) costs (in
financial, temporal and spatial terms) and competing
priorities, (iii) the nature of legislative, strategic and
regulatory support for biosecurity within an enabling
environment, (iv) the complex role of communications
in influencing social change and (v) issues around
consensus about INNS risks across the organisational
landscape. These barriers and opportunities will now
be examined in turn in order to identify possible
mechanisms for enhancing the uptake of biosecurity
measures amongst environment users.
(i) Uncertainty about potential impacts and the
actions of others. Uncertainty characterises the
situation for those considering whether or not to
undertake biosecurity in two important ways.
Firstly, preventative biosecurity hinges on the
presence of uncertainty. Biosecurity has the
most to gain where it prevents new invasions of
as yet unestablished INNS from gaining a
foothold in the environment. As such, biosecu-
rity operates on the precautionary principle
where, if a threat is recognised action is
mandatory regardless of uncertainty (Sandin
1999). However, our evidence suggests that
environment users may not undertake biosecu-
rity unless strong scientific evidence is available
to demonstrate that their specific activities
constitute a risk and that the specific biosecurity
actions they are being advised to undertake will
effectively prevent this risk. This presents a
problem for biosecurity uptake because where
potentially problematic species have yet to
establish in a new environment, scientific
knowledge about the pathways they may take
to spread through that environment, the local
risks of their impacts and how they can be most
effectively contained or killed, is often in its
infancy. The need for greater evidence about
INNS pathways and biosecurity measures to
exist before action can be initiated reveals an
asynchronism between ecological and social
timeframes in relation to INNS invasions; the
rate of our social response (which, despite the
rhetoric, in reality eschews the precautionary
principle) is likely to be much slower than the
ecological rate at which INNS populations
develop a stronghold (Crooks 2005; MacMy-
nowski 2007; Scheffer et al. 2000). This
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suggests that some level of environmental
damage must necessarily be incurred before
action can be initiated.
As important as uncertainty about the scien-
tific evidence supporting biosecurity is uncer-
tainty about the biosecurity actions of others.
This uncertainty strongly undermines environ-
ment users’ confidence in the efficacy of their
own biosecurity measures (Mcleod et al. 2015).
Because a lapse in biosecurity practice by even
a single individual can result in the release of
the progenitor of a snowballing INNS popula-
tion, the risk that individual biosecurity efforts
will be in vain is heightened. The low visibility
of propagules coupled with their potential to
multiply exponentially make biosecurity a par-
ticularly intractable kind of collective action
problem. The failings of environment users to
undertake biosecurity measures are unlikely to
be observed by others since they are likely to
take place in sparsely populated natural areas.
For this reason, and because INNS may reach
new areas without human involvement, it is
particularly difficult to trace invasions back to
individual biosecurity failures. Calculating
accountability is therefore problematic and
there is little recourse to the polluter pays
principle. In contrast to the low visibility of
biosecurity actions in the field, responsive
actions to INNS infestation take the form of
visible control and eradication measures that
when successful have a noticeable, and mea-
surable, impact. For organisations concerned
with projecting a good public image, control
measures may present a more attractive invest-
ment since they produce a measureable change.
The success of preventative actions, on the other
hand, produces none, resulting in no change (the
absence of INNS invasions in the environment).
Without clear evidence that invasions are being
thwarted, organisations, and the individuals
they oversee, may feel that their investments
in biosecurity are not reaping tangible rewards.
However, concentrating on responsive controls
rather than preventative biosecurity will do little
to ensure that INNS do not spread throughout
the environment. The tendency for organisa-
tions to prioritise reactive rather than
anticipatory risk-handling, acting foremostly
to protect their specific, individual interests
reflects collective action failings elsewhere,
wherein short-term, self-interested, rational
behaviour wins out and greater gains are
foregone (Ostrom 1998).
Scholars have identified a number of struc-
tural variables which enhance the chances that
collective action will succeed in sustainably
managing environmental resources (Cox et al.
2010; Ostrom 1990). These include well-de-
fined resource boundaries, the ability to match
rules to local needs and conditions, the ability of
users to determine the rules governing beha-
viour, and for these rules to be respected by
external authorities, the capacity for users to
monitor the behaviour of other users, the ability
to employ sanctions upon those that violate
rules, accessible and affordable means to
resolve disputes, and the nesting of intercon-
nected governance structures from the local
level upwards. Whilst some of these structural
variables are naturally weak in relation to
biosecurity management (for example, resource
boundaries are likely to be fuzzy, and opportu-
nities for monitoring and employing sanctions
are quite scarce), it should be possible to
improve the operation of others. Enhancing
participation in decisions about INNS strategy
through consultation with environment users
across the board and using public research to
determine how to match biosecurity require-
ments to users’ capacities should result in the
production of increasingly adoptable biosecurity
strategies. Support should be given for employ-
ing sanctions where possible (for example
encouraging organisations to blacklist contrac-
tor companies that fail to employ biosecurity
measures), and these sanctions should be pub-
licised as widely as possible. According to
scholars of collective action, campaigns that
encourage environment users to increase their
expectations of a lasting association with the
resource should also help encourage biosecurity
efforts (Ostrom 1998).
(ii) Costs (in financial, temporal and spatial terms)
and competing priorities. The concerns that
participants voiced about costs and competing
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priorities illustrated the cost–benefit analysis
that most were undertaking in determining
whether or not to invest time and resources in
biosecurity. This supports findings elsewhere
that show environmental behaviour to be
strongly influenced by economic incentives
(Diekmann and Preisendo¨rfer 2003). In order
to increase the uptake of biosecurity, strategies
that reduce the individual costs of undertaking
measures (such as the provision of cleaning
stations), increase the perceived individual
costs of non-compliance (sanctions for those
that fail to undertake biosecurity), and raise
awareness of the collective costs to all (through
campaigns and training) should be employed.
Beyond this, rational economic decisions about
whether to undertake biosecurity also hinge
upon beliefs about whether other environment
users are participating or not (since non-partic-
ipation by any single environment user can
introduce INNS, thereby undermining the
efforts of others). As discussed, these suspicions
about inaction present a particularly difficult
barrier to overcome (and one typically found at
the core of collective action problems) (Chant
and Ernst 2008). However, our evidence of the
need for organisations to be seen to be doing the
right thing could incentivise biosecurity regard-
less of the failings of others. As such, reputa-
tional issues and the need to consolidate public
support also feature in rational decision-making
about biosecurity, providing an area of leverage
that could be exploited in biosecurity cam-
paigns. Researchers have reported that environ-
mental campaigns that attempt to affect moral
conscience can be successful at overcoming
economic criteria determining environmental
behaviour (Carrus et al. 2008; Diekmann and
Preisendo¨rfer 2003). As such, biosecurity cam-
paigns that emphasize moral responsibility for
doing the right thing may increase uptake
beyond those that only raise awareness about
negative impacts.
(iii) The nature of legislative, strategic and regula-
tory support for biosecurity within an enabling
environment. Studies of collective action have
underscored the necessity of building responsi-
bility for resource management into well-con-
nected nested tiers from the local up to the
highest level (Ostrom 1990). In the context of
INNS biosecurity New Zealand is at the fore-
front of biosecurity internationally, and the
development of regional partnerships in com-
bination with national legislation have been
identified as key components of the country’s
approach to INNS (Anderson et al. 2014a). In
Europe, steps towards shaping this kind of
regulatory structure are being taken through the
development of recent EU-wide legislation
(Genovesi et al. 2015). However, there are
conflicts between high-level national promotion
of preventative biosecurity and local-level
preferences for prioritising responses to imme-
diate threats. Understanding how to overcome
disparities between preferences for these dif-
ferent types of action on INNS will be key to
implementing effective biosecurity manage-
ment. Collective action research has also
emphasized the importance that resource users
are empowered to determine rules of manage-
ment and also that rules are well matched to
local needs and conditions (Ostrom 1990). As
such, local level environment users must feel
they have the opportunity to influence INNS
policy and structures must be put in place to
enable effective communication and consulta-
tion between the levels of the nested hierarchy.
The development of local environmental for-
ums and networks that focus on biosecurity
enhances opportunities for this. Whilst such
platforms are in existence, funding to further the
scale and reach of their operations could enable
wider participation and ensure better processes
of communication and consultation.
(iv) The complex role of communications in influ-
encing social change. Our findings suggest that
it is not the communication of pure facts about
INNS that determine biosecurity uptake, but
rather the characteristics of how information
about INNS is communicated that ultimately
influences adoption. This reflects research find-
ings elsewhere which suggest that increasing
factual awareness of environmental problems
may not lead to desired results (Yamashita
2014). The points raised by participants about
how biosecurity messages are most effectively
delivered reflect aspects of the communications
theory underpinning the ‘Diffusion of
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Innovations’ framework (Rogers 2003). As
such, face-to-face communications and the
observability of biosecurity behaviour in the
field were both highlighted as effective ways to
persuade people to uptake biosecurity, whilst
mass mail outs such as newsletters and elec-
tronic communications were considered less
effective. Participants also discussed the roles of
peer pressure and social norms and highlighted
the importance that information is delivered by
the right person and complements the recipient’s
level of interest and enthusiasm. These points
reflect Rogers’ (2003) emphasis on interper-
sonal communication channels, the role of
opinion leaders and the concept of a ‘critical
mass’ being reached from whence a behaviour
change becomes a self-propelling norm that
spreads throughout a social system. As such,
facilitating opportunities for communications
about INNS between environment users at
meetings, events and forums, expanding the
reach of key individuals and those that span
organisational boundaries to help spread INNS
messages, and finding ways to publicise
instances of biosecurity uptake, should all help
to persuade more individuals to employ
measures.
(v) Issues around consensus about INNS risks
across the organisational landscape. In order
for successful collective action to occur, a key
condition is for stakeholders to agree that the
problem at hand is a serious one (Ostrom 2004).
Research participants displayed a lack of con-
sensus about the nature and seriousness of the
risks posed by INNS, and varying levels of
knowledge and understanding characterised the
landscape of perceptions about biosecurity.
These differences were consolidated by differ-
ences in organisational capacities to employ
staff with specialist knowledge. For effective
action to be taken on biosecurity, awareness-
raising measures and opportunities for exper-
tise-sharing are likely to be needed to smooth
out some of these differences. However,
because participants reported relatively indi-
vidualist interpretations of INNS risks, targeted
awareness-raising campaigns may do more to
align perceptions of the seriousness of INNS
than more generalist approaches.
Conclusion
Whilst prevention may be better than cure where
INNS are concerned, which warrants the uptake of
biosecurity measures, this research highlights the
barriers to adoption of biosecurity amongst environ-
ment users. These include: financial constraints linked
to a lack of knowledge about invasion pathways and
control measures, a focus on managing already
established and visible INNS, and collective action
problems if others fail to undertake biosecurity. The
costs associated with implementing biosecurity mean
that there is a reluctance to commit financially to
undertaking biosecurity without the certainty of a
return on investment. This would not only require
more scientific evidence about specific INNS path-
ways of spread and the efficacy of measures for
controlling them (which may not yet exist in the case
of new INNS invasions), but more difficult still, would
require certainty about the actions of other individuals
whose activities may spread INNS in the environment.
Additionally, there is little recourse to impose pun-
ishments on those who fail to undertake biosecurity,
with many organisations failing to strictly enforce
biosecurity compliance amongst staff and contractors.
The low visibility of INNS propagules, limited
measurability and attributability of successful biose-
curity, and limited opportunities for monitoring
biosecurity actions in the field, contribute to an out
of sight out of mind attitude to INNS.
Preventative biosecurity offers the best chance to
slow the rate of INNS invasions and protect valued
environments from their impacts. However, as this
research has shown, its uptake constitutes a tough
collective action problem that will require carefully
targeted policy to overcome. According to the findings
of this research, those seeking to devise effective
policy and strategy around biosecurity should consider
shaping biosecurity campaigns that focus on moral
conscience rather than negative impacts alone.
Umbrella groups should facilitate social networking
amongst users of natural areas, ensure effective two-
way communications between management hierar-
chies overseeing natural areas, and encourage strong
levels of participation in decisions on biosecurity
strategy from environmental field workers. Cam-
paigns should be shaped to target specific user groups
and steps should be taken to enhance the visibility of
successful biosecurity through national accreditations
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and as well as increasing awareness of the sanctions
imposed on those who fail to undertake biosecurity.
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